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Abstract 
Purpose  This study investigates the links between accounting values in Chinese listed 
companies‟ balance sheets and the exposure of their fraudulent activities.  
Design/methodology/approach  Every balance sheet account is proposed to be a potential 
vehicle to manipulate financial statements. 
Findings  Other receivables, inventories, prepaid expenses, employee benefits payables and 
long-term payables are important indicators of fraudulent financial statements. These results 
confirm that asset account manipulation is frequently carried out and cast doubt on earlier 
conclusions by researchers that inflation of liabilities is the most common source of financial 
statement manipulation. 
Originality/value  Prior practices of solely scaling balance sheet values by assets are 
revealed to produce spurious relationships, while scaling by both assets and sales effectively 
detects fraudulent financial statements and provides a useful fraud prediction tool for Chinese 
auditors, regulators and investors. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the role of accounting balance sheet values in detecting fraudulent 
financial statements (FFS). Weak capital market regulatory oversight and a lack of 
transparency in corporate governance and financial reporting practices foster opportunities 
for earnings management in the Chinese market. The need for managers to exercise 
subjective judgement in financial reporting allows for earnings management opportunities 
that can lead to stock mispricing and the extraction of private benefits. Hence, the distinct 
features of the Chinese financial system provide opportunities for controlling shareholders 
and managers of listed firms to engage in fraudulent activities (Baucus and Near, 1991). This 
has resulted in the recent exposure of many cases of fraud (Jia et al., 2009). For example, 581 
enforcement actions were taken against listed firms between 1994 and 2007 (Chen et al., 
2006). The contribution of this study is to forecast the incidence of fraud in Chinese listed 
firms by examining balance sheet accounts.  
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the main regulator of securities 
markets in China. The CSRC conducts regular as well as random reviews of listed companies, 
investigates cases of fraud, and carries out enforcement actions (Chen et al., 2006). However, 
their exposure of fraudulent activities tends to be superficial and lacks timeliness. For 
example, in 2005 the Koyo Group was punished by both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) and the CSRC for concealing significant information, including a large amount of 
lending, illegal diversion of funds to controlling shareholders, and the true ownership of the 
firm. Such cases raise questions for investors. For example, how did the Koyo Group manage 
to hide substantial economic transactions in its account balances? In 2007, two years after the 
CSRC‟s exposure of fraud, the details were finally made public. The Koyo Group fabricated 
a series of „bank statements‟ and falsified „prepaid expenses for in-progress projects‟, thereby 
concealing 1.4 billion RMB in losses from three high-tech projects.
 
From 2000 to 2003, they 
also inflated construction in-progress, other receivables, biochemical construction, fixed 
assets and management fees by a total of 169 million RMB. Yet, from the scant information 
announced by the CSRC in 2005, it was difficult for market participants to identify the true 
extent of the firm‟s financial manipulation. Many studies have successfully detected FFS, but 
they have tended to focus on the role of corporate governance, in both China and developed 
countries (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Jian and Wong, 2010; Liu and 
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Lu, 2007). This study extends this literature by identifying special relationships between 
balance sheet accounts of Chinese listed firms to more timely detect the incidence of FFS.  
Several contributions to the literature are made. First, every account in the balance sheet is 
considered as a potential vehicle for identifying FFS. Using a hand-collected database of 
CSRC enforcement actions for fraudulent activities by Chinese listed companies, specific 
balance sheet accounts are identified that predict each different type of financial statement 
violation. Through robustness tests, these relationships continue to hold. The intuition is as 
follows. In contrast to practices in developed countries, top Chinese managers frequently 
possess total control over the accounting system (Luo and Hassan, 2009). As a result, 
management can hide fraudulent behaviour in the accounts with less chance of being 
discovered.  
Second, the results are substantiated by scaling the probit regression variables using both 
assets and sales in order to model the multivariate relationships with fraud. Evidence is 
presented of a link between balance sheet accounting values and subsequent detection of FFS 
by the CSRC. Fraudulent Chinese firms are found to frequently manipulate “other 
receivables”, which is consistent with previous findings (Jiang et al., 2010). However, prior 
studies have tended to neglect to examine accounts such as other current assets and intangible 
assets, which are also unusually high in the sample of fraudulent Chinese firms.  
Third, evidence is produced that past findings of higher leverage for fraudulent firms may 
result from a spurious relationship between leverage and FFS due to scaling account values 
by assets. Higher leverage may simply be the result of lower equity in fraudulent firms. 
Scaling by sales and studying the components of debt separately reveals evidence of lower 
leverage in some liability accounts of fraudulent firms.  
Fourth, certain balance sheet accounts are found to be associated with different types of fraud 
violation. For example, frauds involving related-party transactions are associated with high 
“other receivables”, “prepaid expense”, “other currents”, “short-term loans”, “employee 
benefits payable”, “long-term debt” and “long-term payables”. The pattern of accounts 
identified allows for the effective prediction of each different type of fraud.  
The usefulness of the developed probit model as a classification tool is also assessed. Correct 
predictions of fraudulent firms and non-fraudulent firms are above 56% for in-sample tests, 
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and above 50% for some subsamples in out-of-sample tests. Applying the model to the 
population of all listed Chinese firms, the correct prediction of non-fraudulent firms is above 
80%. Thus, the evidence supports the helpfulness of balance sheet information in identifying 
FFS.  
Finally, the hand-collection of a database of CSRC enforcement actions allows further 
insights into the relationship between corporate governance in Chinese market and the 
incidence of corporate fraud. Chinese market is characterised by a high concentration of state 
ownership; extremely low share ownership by insider managers and directors; a two-tier 
internal governance structure; a weak legal structure; deficient market control mechanisms; a 
lack of enforcement law; and an inefficient managerial labour market (Jiang et al., 2010). 
Evidence is produced that corporate governance is inadequate in preventing fraudulent 
behaviour. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on fraud-
seeking activities and related theories. Section 3 describes the sample, data, and methods used 
in the study. Section 4 presents the empirical results and robustness checks are discussed in 
Section 5. Section 6 summaries the conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis development 
Instances of FFS have been prevalent in recent decades (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Qwest) and 
auditors are increasingly under pressure to identify potential fraud. The challenge for 
researchers is how to detect fraud in a timely manner to minimize the loss of shareholders‟ 
funds. To date, the most frequently occurring fraudulent behaviours identified in balance 
sheets have been overstatements of income (or assets) or understatements of expenses (or 
liabilities) (Bonner et al., 1998; Spathis et al., 2002). Fraudulent statements often overstate 
revenue before it is earned, overstate assets by understating allowances for receivables, or 
overstate the value of inventory, property, and other tangible assets (Spathis et al., 2002). 
Beneish (1999a) finds three main techniques for manipulating profits are changing 
accounting methods, counterfeiting financial records, and prematurely or fictitiously 
recording expenses and revenues.  
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Previous empirical findings identify certain asset-related financial statement variables that are 
often manipulated by firms under investigation for fraud. These accounts include accounts 
receivable (Bonner et al., 1998), other receivables (Jiang et al., 2010) and allowance for 
doubtful accounts and inventory (Stice, 1991). Simunic (1980) argues that auditing both 
receivables and inventories are complex tasks for auditors. These accounts require a forecast 
of future events, and are regarded as risky balance sheet components. Stice (1991) shows that 
there is generally a higher risk of error in an account when its value is derived from 
subjective judgement. When such accounts represent a relatively large portion of total assets, 
the prevalence of FFS increases.  
Debt accounts have also been found to be common indicators of FFS. Chen et al. (2006) 
reveal that fraudulent firms have greater financial leverage than matched firms. Firms with 
higher leverage are more likely to violate debt covenants and less likely to gain additional 
capital (Fan et al., 2008). Therefore, managers have incentives to manipulate accounts by 
understating liabilities or overstating assets in order to meet certain debt covenants. When 
liabilities increase, the risk to equity owners and managers can be transferred to debt holders 
and the likelihood of FFS is increased (Spathis et al., 2002). 
The above findings are generally consistent with managers‟ incentives to understate expenses 
or overstate revenues when a firm‟s profit is low. Beneish (1999a) finds that fraudulent firms 
have lower return on assets and higher sales growth than matched firms before public 
disclosure. Using a variety of profitability measures, Spathis et al. (2002) also find that 
fraudulent firms are less profitable than matched firms. Hence, the association between FFS 
and lower profitability suggests that managers may have incentives to manipulate accounting 
records in order to increase apparent firm profits.  
Most earlier studies focus on specific types of violations and limit their hypotheses to the 
manipulation of certain accounts. In contrast, this study involves a systematic examination 
that covers all the accounts in the balance sheet. Using this method, this study seeks to 
answer two important questions. First, which balance sheet variables are most frequently used 
to engage in FFS? Second, which particular balance sheet variables are used to perpetuate 
each type of fraud? 
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Double entry accounting rules imply that for firms with FFS, there will be higher asset 
account balances or lower liability account balances associated with a manipulated profit 
change. Accordingly, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H1. Individual balance sheet account values for firms with FFS will be different from those in 
a matched sample of firms without FFS.  
In contrast to the previous literature, this study proposes that fraudulent manipulation of 
financial statements could arise in many different accounts with different companies and for 
different motivations. For example, in 1996 Qiongminyuan recorded fictitious profits of 540 
million RMB and inflated the capital reserve by 6.57 billion RMB. Also in 1996, Chengdu 
Hongguang recorded a fictitious profit of 157 million RMB by fabricating sales, inflating 
inventory and manipulating other accounts. Hence, for different types of fraud, firms are 
motivated by different incentives; some relate to the firm‟s rights issuance (Chen and Yuan, 
2004) and others relate to the managers‟ personal interests. For example, Jian and Wong 
(2010) find that subsequent to propping up failing firms, controlling shareholders tunnel cash 
for their personal benefit by creating fictitious related party loans receivable.   
Following from the above, this study proposes that there are systematic relationships between 
the type of fraudulent behaviour and the choice of balance sheet account used.  Hence, 
different types of fraud violation will be associated with different balance sheet accounts. 
This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2. There exists a relationship between the type of fraud violation undertaken and the 
specific balance sheet accounts manipulated.  
If different accounts are used for different types of fraud, then a comprehensive testing 
method is necessary. Earlier studies tend to focus on certain account ratios to find possible 
indicators of fraud (Chen et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2010). Yet, restricting the analysis in this 
way may cause a missing variable problem in the regression equation. This study undertakes 
a more comprehensive approach to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
financial statements by including all balance sheet accounts as explanatory variables to avoid 
the missing variable bias.
 
This is particularly important for Chinese firms because of the 
special features of corporate governance in China. Regulatory pressures create certain 
financial restrictions for Chinese firms and this may stimulate fraudulent behaviour, such as 
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smoothing earnings to improve financial performance, recover lost reputational capital or 
gain additional sources of funds (Szwajkowski, 1985). Chinese financial disclosure lacks 
transparency (Liu, 2006), and this provides the opportunity for deception by managing 
earnings (Aharony et al., 2000). If managers are trying to deceive auditors and investors, they 
will choose to falsify those accounts that are most easily manipulated and/or have less chance 
of being detected. Therefore, it is important to investigate all balance sheet accounts.  
 
3. Sample and Methodology 
The sample comprises 656 unique cases of FFS by 313 listed Chinese firms (hereafter, 
fraudulent firms), reported between 1994 and 2011. This study also classifies the sample into 
two subsamples. The first subsample includes FFS cases of firms with either one violation 
announcement or multiple violation announcements from non-consecutive years. The second 
subsample consists of FFS cases of firms with multiple violation announcements from 
consecutive years.
 
The likelihood of detection of fraud by the CSRC is expected to be greater 
for firms found to commit numerous violations over consecutive years. For data analysis 
purposes, the “announcement year” is defined as the first year in which fraudulent reporting 
is exposed. 
The majority of the violations data are hand-collected from the descriptive information in 
Punishment Bulletins issued by the CSRC and the Integrity of Files websites maintained by 
the SHSE and SZSE. In addition, some cases of FFS are collected from the Law Yearbook of 
China, Securities Times, Shanghai Securities Daily and yearbooks produced by the two stock 
exchanges. For some firms, fraudulent reporting is disclosed twice or more. For example, 
three violations are reported for Hunan Henyang Jinli Technology, which are treated as one 
firm and three FFS cases. 
Prior to exclusions, a total of 734 cases of fraud are identified across 369 firms (see Panel A 
of Table 1). Firms for which annual report information is missing, that issue B-shares or are 
in the financial sector are excluded from the sample. Following Beasley (1996), each 
fraudulent firm is matched with a non-fraudulent firm. Matched firms must be in the same 
industry and of similar listing age and firm size (within 20 percent of the total assets of the 
related fraudulent firm) at the date of the fraudulent firm‟s exposure. To be included in the 
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matching firm sample, financial statement data must be available for three years from one 
year prior to the fraud to one year after. For a firm that commits fraud in consecutive years, 
only one matched firm is chosen, based on the first fraud exposure. The sample firms‟ 
financial data are obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
financial database. The above procedure yields a sample of 656 cases across 313 fraudulent 
firms.  
Table 1 also presents the sample distributions by year (Panel B), industry (Panel C) and 
violation type (Panel D) pertaining to exposed Chinese corporate fraudulent activities. Panel 
B reveals that the number of fraud cases increased dramatically between 2001 and 2011, 
having peaked in 2005. The pervasiveness of fraud is particularly evident when reviewed 
relative to all listed Chinese firms, peaking at 5.34% in 2001. Panel C reveals that the sectors 
with the highest proportions of firm violations are manufacturing with 55.27% and real estate 
with 11.82%.  
The violation types that describe the nature of the offences are used to identify the linkages 
between balance sheet account values and the exposure of fraud. The violation types are 
listed in Panel D of Table 1 in descending order of frequency, and examples are provided in 
Appendix 1. Many fraud announcements report multiple violations, so in total there are 1143 
instances of violations among the 656 cases.  
 [Insert Table 1 Here] 
This study hypothesizes that fraudulent firms can potentially manipulate any balance sheet 
account to accomplish their deception. Accordingly, to detect fraudulent firms from 
information contained in their balance sheets, this study takes the novel approach of including 
all balance sheet accounts as explanatory variables in the analysis. This is in contrast to 
previous studies, which select fewer balance sheet account variables. The balance sheet 
accounts of fraudulent firms are expected to display some statistical differences relative to 
those of the matched firms.  
Probit regression is employed to identify the relationships between accounting values and 
fraudulent behaviours in balance sheets. The identified model is then used in an out-of-
sample period to predict firms likely to commit fraud in the future. In the probit regression, 
the dependent variable is the probability of fraud for firm i and the main independent 
9 
 
variables of interest are balance sheet account values, ΣXi,j,t. Control variables are 
incorporated for the potential influence of corporate governance (Σcontrol i,k, t). 
Probit Model:  
Probability of (Fraudi, t=1) =     ∑         
 
   
  ∑               
 
   
       (1) 
Where 
F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF); Fraud= a dummy variable 
with a value of one when the firm is subject to an enforcement action and zero if it is a non-
fraudulent matched firm; 
ΣXi, t= the explanatory variables of balance sheet account ratios; 
In order to check the accuracy of the model, the following two measures are applied using in-
sample and out-of-sample data:  
1) Fraud prediction ratio (r1): the ratio of the number of correctly predicted 
fraudulent firms to the total number of fraudulent firms.  
2) Non-fraud prediction ratio (r0): the ratio of the number of correctly predicted 
non-fraudulent firms relative to the total number of non-fraudulent firms.  
A ratio result of 50% implies a naïve prediction suggesting no predictive power for the model. 
Only when these ratios are above 50% can it be concluded that the model of balance sheet 
accounting variables is helpful in predicting FFS.  
 
Prior studies show that the quality of corporate governance influences earnings quality and 
managerial manipulation (Beasley et al.; 1996; Chen et al., 2006; Liu and Lu, 2007). 
Accordingly, three groups of corporate governance variables pertaining to ownership 
structure, board of directors and other firm-level attributes are included as control variables in 
the above probit model.  
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4. Empirical results 
Table 2 compares the mean values of each balance sheet account scaled by total assets for 
fraudulent firms and matching firms.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Reviewing the full sample results in Panel A of Table 2, many significant differences are 
observed between the fraudulent and matched samples. Among the asset accounts and 
relative to the matching firms, fraudulent firms have higher other receivables, other current 
accounts and intangible assets, but lower cash and cash equivalents, inventories and accounts 
receivable. For the liability and equity accounts, fraudulent firms have higher short-term 
loans, other short-term liabilities, other non-current liabilities, share capital and capital 
reserves, but lower other stockholders‟ equity.  
Panels B and C of Table 2 present the respective mean balance sheet accounts for the non-
consecutive and consecutive subsamples. The direction of the results, the differences between 
the fraudulent and matching firms and the levels of significance are similar to the full sample 
results in Panel A. The differences between fraudulent and matched firms are greater for 
consecutive announcements, possibly due to their stronger pattern of on-going violations 
relative to non-consecutive announcements. For example, for cash and cash equivalents, the 
difference between fraudulent and matched firms is 6.1% for the consecutive subsample 
(Panel C), and only 2.6% for the non-consecutive subsample (Panel B).  
Before undertaking the multivariate analysis, the possible influence of multicollinearity 
between the account variables must be addressed. In untabulated analyses, fixed assets and 
retained earnings are found to be correlated with the remaining variables. Accordingly, two 
OLS regressions are run, first with fixed assets and then with retained earnings as the 
dependent variable. The remaining balance sheet accounts are the explanatory variables. The 
residuals from these regressions are then substituted in place of the original values of fixed 
assets and retained earnings in subsequent analyses. By using the residuals collinearity has 
been effectively removed, but the identification problem has not been entirely solved. Hence, 
some of the relationships depicted in the other variables could possibly be due to the 
correlated fixed assets or retained earnings. Nevertheless, there is no difference between 
using the original values or the residuals, since the R-squared is the same in both regressions. 
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After the above treatment for collinearity, probit regressions are used to test the relationships 
between balance sheet account values and the incidence of FFS, the results of which are 
shown in Table 3. Panels A to C of Table 3 provide in-sample results for the full, non-
consecutive and consecutive subsamples, respectively; Panels D to E report out-of-sample 
results separately. For the in-sample tests, data from all 1994 to 2011 time periods are used 
and for the out-of-sample tests the entire period is divided into two: the estimation period 
(first twelve years) and the prediction period (last six years). As expected, in Panels A to C of 
Table 3 consistently strong signals are observed in many variables. The consistently 
significant positive coefficients for other receivables, prepaid expenses and intangible assets, 
and negative coefficients for inventories indicate that enforcement action for FFS is more 
likely when firms report higher balances in the above asset accounts, and lower inventory 
balances. Most of the differences in the coefficients for these accounts in the subsample of 
consecutive firm announcements are more than double those of non-consecutive firms. On 
the liability side, the coefficients reported in the consecutive subsample for the variables 
short-term loans, employee benefits payable and long-term payables are more than triple 
those of the non-consecutive subsample, indicating even more extreme differences between 
firms that have and have not experienced enforcement actions for fraud. Furthermore, taxes 
payable and other non-current liabilities have coefficients that are significantly negative for 
the non-consecutive subsample but significantly positive for the consecutive subsample. The 
deferred tax liabilities account is strongly significant and positive for the non-consecutive 
subsample but negative and weakly significant within the consecutive subsample. On the 
equity side, the only variable of note is other stockholders‟ equity; the consecutive 
subsamples‟ coefficients are strongly significantly positive while the non-consecutive 
subsamples‟ coefficients are strongly significantly negative. These findings suggest that firms 
that are subject to enforcement actions may falsify particular accounts, or that they share 
certain problems that are reflected in their financial statements. 
Generally the probit model results consistently support Hypothesis 1 that some balance sheet 
account values are different for fraudulent firms relative to a matched control sample of non-
fraudulent firms. These ratios could potentially be used as indicators to detect fraudulent 
behaviour. Moreover, the signals of the presence of FFS are systematically stronger for firms 
with consecutive fraud announcements than for those with non-consecutive announcements. 
The most important signals on the asset side are the presence of higher other receivables, 
higher prepaid expenses, and lower inventories, and on the liability side are the incidence of 
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higher short-term loans, employee benefits payable, and long-term payables. The finding of 
higher other receivable balances in firms targeted for enforcement action is consistent with 
previous findings (Jiang et al., 2010; Liu and Lu, 2007). However, the finding that fraudulent 
firms have lower inventory balances runs counter to prior research evidence from developed 
countries (Spathis et al., 2002). One possibility is that Chinese fraudulent firms may 
manipulate inventories downwards by selling goods to related parties in order to tunnel funds 
(Cheung et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2011). On the liability side, previous research presents 
evidence of higher leverage associated with fraudulent firms (Chen et al., 2006). A similar 
result is also found in this paper; however, by separating leverage into different accounts, 
lower liabilities are found in some accounts. One explanation is that the component accounts 
are subject to different degrees of managerial discretion. For example, employee benefits 
payable and long-term payables are „soft‟ accounts that allow managers to exercise more 
subjective judgement in determining values relative to long-term debt (Dechow et al., 2011). 
Therefore, manipulators are more likely to misrepresent the former accounts.  
Table 3 provides information on the model‟s predictive accuracy. The in-sample correct 
prediction rates are all greater than 50%; however the accuracy for the stronger cases of 
consecutive announcements is greater than 80%. A better test of predictability is achieved 
through out-of-sample tests, the results of which are shown in Panels D, E and F of Table 3. 
The model is based solely on data from the earlier estimation period (first twelve years) and 
the correct prediction rates are calculated using the balance sheet values from the later 
prediction period (last six years). Panels D, E and F indicate that the prediction accuracy of 
non-fraudulent firms is well above a naïve 50% benchmark, ranging from 82% for the non-
consecutive announcement subsample to 94% for the consecutive announcement subsample. 
However, Panels D and E in Table 3 also show that the misclassification of fraudulent firms 
is high. Nevertheless, results from untabulated analyses applying the model to all available 
Chinese listed firms (2342 firms) indicate an impressive 81.17% correct prediction rate of no 
enforcement action for non-fraudulent firms and 57.37% correct prediction rate for fraudulent 
firms. These results suggest that the model can help to identify potential fraudulent firms.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
As reported in Table 4, to test the robustness of the results, a probit regression is performed 
by scaling all account balances by sales instead of total assets. The same significant 
relationships persist in many asset variables as with the previous analysis. The likelihood of 
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fraud enforcement announcements is greater for firms that display higher other receivables, 
higher prepaid expenses and lower inventory balances. The previously identified pattern of 
asset account coefficients being double for firms with consecutive announcements relative to 
those with non-consecutive announcements is also confirmed. Similar relationships also 
persist on the liability side. The balance sheets of firms that are more likely to be exposed for 
fraud are characterised by higher employee benefits payable, long-term payables and deferred 
tax liabilities in the non-consecutive subsample, and lower deferred tax liabilities in the 
consecutive subsample. However, significant relationships for short-term loans and taxes 
payable are not observed in the sales-scaled regressions. Instead, the enforcement action for 
FFS is more likely when firms report lower share capital. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
The differences between the asset-based and sales-based regressions may be explained by the 
possibility of spurious relationships resulting from scaling by assets. On average, fraudulent 
firms have lower profitability and lower retained earnings balances, so the regression 
coefficients for asset-based ratios could be highly positive when the ratio denominators are 
lower, even when the associated account balance is not related to the status of fraud. This bias 
exists in asset-based ratios and can be significantly reduced by scaling by sales rather than 
assets. Nevertheless, sales are normally positively associated with total assets and the 
spurious relationship caused by total assets may indirectly, but to a lesser extent, also affect 
the results when scaling by sales.  
Using the above reasoning, the earlier finding from the asset-based regressions that 
fraudulent firms have higher short-loans could be due to this spurious bias. Scaling the 
balance sheet values by assets has the advantage of enhancing the comparability of results 
with earlier studies that conclude that fraudulent firms have higher leverage (Chen et al., 
2006; Firth et al., 2011). However, using sales-based regressions, higher leverage in 
fraudulent firms is found to concentrated in accounts payable, employee benefits payable, 
long-term payables and other non-current liabilities. Yet firms with consecutive enforcement 
actions have lower long-term debt and deferred tax liabilities. Given that different 
components of debt show different relationships, it is important for different components of 
debt to be analysed separately.  
14 
 
The choice of scaling method also affects the findings with respect to retained earnings. 
While the asset-based regression results generally indicate positive coefficients for retained 
earnings, in the sales-based regression they are significantly negative. The latter indicates that 
fraudulent firms have lower retained earnings per unit value of average sales, which is 
consistent with the earlier univariate results. This analysis fails to reach a definitive 
conclusion with respect to retained earnings; hence this should be investigated further in 
future studies. While the use of residuals helps to eliminate problems of high correlations, it 
does not solve the identification problem completely.  
The next analysis considers whether or not different types of fraud are associated with 
different balance sheet accounting ratios. As shown in Panel D of Table 1, there are many 
announcements of fraud cases that involve multiple fraud violations. Separate cross-sectional 
probit analyses are conducted for each of the six most common types of violations. Some of 
the similar but less common offences from types 7 to 9 are aggregated into one type 
(type789). The empirical results are detailed in Table 5. The correct prediction rates of an 
absence of fraud enforcement range from 69% for violations of delays in disclosure and false 
statements (types 3 and 4) to 88% for the illegal possession of funds (type6). Hence, the 
predictive power of the model improves when separate regressions are performed on separate 
subsamples of the most common types of violations. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
The likelihood of certain violations are found to be typically associated with specific balance 
sheet accounts. Firms that are more likely to falsify statements (type4) or delay disclosure 
(type5) tend to report lower cash and cash equivalents, whereas frauds involving illegal 
possession of funds (type6) have higher cash balances. Firms that are more likely to 
undertake fraudulent related-party transactions (type1) or false statements (type4) tend to 
have higher employee benefits payable and lower taxes payable balances. The exposure of 
violations using related-party transactions (type1) or external loan guarantees (type5) is 
associated with higher deferred tax liabilities. Furthermore, fraudulent firms that conceal 
significant contracts/events (type2) or make false statements (type4) report lower balances of 
other stockholders‟ equity. However, across the different types of violations tested, the most 
consistent predictor of fraud is other receivables; its coefficient is significantly positive in all 
seven types. This implies that other receivables may be commonly used in the conduct of 
many different types of fraud[1].
 
While some accounting ratios are commonly associated with 
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the exposure of many different types of fraud, each violation type has its own special 
indicator(s)[ 2 ]. Hence, the results support the second hypothesis that there exists a 
relationship between the type of fraud violation and the specific accounts associated with that 
particular fraud. The tendencies for balance sheet accounts to be significantly high or low for 
each violation type are summarised in Table 6. 
 [Insert Table 6 Here] 
Past studies present evidence that various characteristics of corporate governance are 
associated with quality of financial reporting (Beasley et al.; 1996; Chen et al., 2006; Firth et 
al., 2011; Liu and Lu, 2007). Corporate governance in China has distinct features that may or 
may not be effective in mitigating FFS. Accordingly, corporate governance and firm-level 
variables are next incorporated into the probit regression. Several corporate governance 
variables from past studies  are included in the analysis: Govt (a dummy variable with a value 
of one if the government or a government-owned institution is the largest shareholder and 
zero otherwise), Tradable (proportion of shares owned by individual shareholders), 
Herfindahl (the concentration of shares held by the top ten shareholders, other than the 
controlling one), Top (shares held by the largest shareholder), INED (the percentage of 
independent directors on the board), Board (the number of directors on the board), Dual (a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company's CEO is also the chairman of the 
board and zero otherwise), SBSIZE (the number of members on the supervisory board), 
SBMEET (the number of meetings of the supervisory board), and CPA (a dummy variable 
coded one if the auditor was one of the 10 biggest auditors by market share and zero 
otherwise). The firm-level variables are ST (a dummy variable coded one if the firm 
experienced special treatment before the announcement of fraud and zero otherwise), PT (a 
dummy variable coded one if the firm experienced particular transfer before the 
announcement of fraud and zero otherwise), and RET (annual stock return over risk-free rate). 
The results are reported in Table 7[3]. Panel A presents the results from a probit regression of 
all corporate governance variables on the propensity to conduct fraud. The significant 
variables from the Panel A regression, Board, Top, ST, PT and RET are then added as 
explanatory variables to the previous Table 3 probit regression of balance sheet account 
values on a corporate fraud indicator. The account variables are scaled by total assets (Panel 
B), and by total sales (Panel C). 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
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Chen et al. (2006) show that the presence of poor financial performance is associated with 
fraudulent behaviours. Also, board size may reduce the likelihood of fraud through better 
monitoring (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). As expected, the propensity to conduct fraud is 
negatively related a firm‟s board size (Board) and its annual stock returns (RET). The 
negative coefficient of Top suggests that large majority shareholdings can support an 
incentive alignment effect (Fan and Wong, 2002). For firm-level governance characteristics, 
the propensity to engage in financial fraud is positively affected by the designation of firms 
as special treatment (ST) or particular transfer (PT) status before the announcement year.  
Most importantly, with respect to the main variables of interest in this study, the results in 
Panels B and C are broadly consistent with the prior results in Panels A, B and C of Tables 3 
and 4. Specifically, other receivables, inventories, other current assets and long-term payables 
are consistently associated with a firms‟ propensity to commit fraud.  
 
5. Robustness tests 
The main results presented above explain the exposure of FFS using balance sheet account 
values over a three-year period centred on the announcement year of the fraud. To capture 
how account balances change before and after the disclosure of enforcement actions, annual 
regressions are next run with three subsamples in a one-year cross-section (year -1, year 0 
and year +1 relative to the announcement year). The results are shown in Table 8, and 
generally confirm the earlier significant relationships from Table 3. Additionally, a clear 
pattern is detected in the following significant variables: other receivables, prepaid expenses, 
other currents, short-term loans, deferred tax liabilities, and retained earnings. In these 
accounts, the coefficient values are highest in the year prior to the fraud announcement (year 
-1), and decline progressively in the announcement year (year 0) and year following (year +1). 
This is consistent with an interpretation that the public announcement of fraud may influence 
firms to moderate their fraudulent behaviours and/or engage in some remediation activities 
that are reflected in a progressive normalisation of the balance sheet accounts.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
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The previous model assumes that the cost of errors for fraud prediction (type I error) and non-
fraud prediction (type II error) are the same. Furthermore, fraudulent firms are oversampled 
relative to their true proportion in all Chinese listed companies, so that the state-based sample 
contains more fraudulent firms than would a random sample. In addition, the probit model is 
a type of binary classification model, which uses the standard maximum likelihood procedure 
to estimate and this dichotomous-state model ignores the state-based sample procedures 
which can lead to biased coefficient estimates (Beneish, 1999b). For robustness, a weighted 
probit model is instead employed, and.untabulated results show that the prediction results 
remain unchanged.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study employs a systematic approach to detect financial fraud in Chinese listed firm 
balance sheet statements. Each balance sheet account is hypothesized to be potentially used 
as a vehicle for FFS. The probability of balance sheet accounts being associated with various 
types of fraud is systematically investigated. In prior research, other receivables, inventories 
and total debt have been identified as determinants of fraud and those findings are confirmed 
in this study. However, this study produces evidence in both asset-scaled and sales-scaled 
regressions that high balances of prepaid expenses, other current assets, employee benefit 
payable and unusual balances of deferred tax liabilities are also commonly associated with 
fraud in Chinese listed company financial statements. 
The values of the regression coefficients for balance sheet accounts that show a significant 
relationship to fraudulent statements are greatest prior to the year of the fraud violation 
announcement, become smaller in the announcement year and decline further the following 
year. This suggests that a public announcement to expose a fraud may have an impact on the 
firm committing the fraud, triggering a partial reversal effect visible through the financial 
statement accounts. The evidence presented that the coefficients of significant balance sheet 
accounts are greater for those firms experiencing consecutive announcements than for those 
with non-consecutive announcements is consistent with the interpretation that consecutive  
announcements are indicative of more serious fraud. 
18 
 
This study also finds that many accounts are important indicators of different types of fraud; 
each type has its own important indicators. For example, when crimes involve concealing 
significant contracts or events, the accounts “other receivables”, “prepaid expense” and 
“short-term loans” tend to be inflated.  Generally the correct prediction rates of fraud are over 
69% for most offences, which is well above the naïve correct prediction of 50%. Importantly, 
the models may provide a helpful tool to detect FFS in all Chinese firms. The correct 
prediction rate of the absence of fraud in Chinese listed firms is an impressive 81%. This 
study also challenges some earlier studies such as Chen et al. (2006), Jiang et al. (2010), and 
Stice (1999) that focus on a limited number of accounting ratios. There may be at least two 
methodological problems in such studies: the missing variables bias and spurious 
relationships. Results in this study suggest that the likelihood of fraud is detected through a 
variety of balance sheet accounts. Prior research to detect FFS has tended to investigate a 
limited number of accounts, suggesting the potential for missing variables and bias in the 
regression parameter estimates. Furthermore, the conventional practice of using asset-scaled 
explanatory variables to explain the propensity to engage in fraud may result in spurious 
relationships. For example, prior such studies find evidence of higher leverage for fraudulent 
firms (Chen et al., 2006; Spathis et al., 2002). Yet the results suggest that this could be a 
result of lower equity in fraudulent firms. By examining the components of debt separately, 
this study produces evidence of lower leverage in some liability accounts of fraudulent firms. 
Therefore, a thorough examination of all balance sheet account values and the adoption of 
two scaling methods (total assets and sales) are recommended in order to explore the 
relationship between balance sheet accounts and FFS.  
This study finds that some ownership and governance characteristics of firms have an impact 
on the propensity to falsify financial statements. However, the only effective corporate 
governance mechanisms are board size and the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder, which are negatively associated with FFS. Hence, the efficiency of corporate 
governance mechanisms in China remains a grave concern.  
The research results are of considerable importance for both investors and regulators. For 
investors, the signals in balance sheet account information can assist them to control 
unsystematic investment risk. The prediction model may also be useful for the CSRC in the 
development of an early warning system for FFS, thereby assisting to improve the quality of 
financial reporting and deter misconduct by management. The CSRC can also use the 
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common fraud types and malfeasant practices to promulgate detailed guidelines for auditors 
and directors to promote the integrity of financial reporting practices. 
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Appendix 1: Examples of the violation types 
Lengguang Industrial: Type 1 (Related party transactions) 
Shanghai Lengguang Industrial Co. Ltd., was penalized by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 
1999 for failing to disclose the exact amount of a major loan guarantee in a timely manner. In 
their 1998 annual report, Lengguang disclosed a total loan guarantee of 186.3 million RMB; 
however, this was upgraded to 3593.9 million RMB in their 1999 interim report. 
 
S*ST Yahua: Type 2 (Concealment of significant contracts or events) 
Hunan Yahua Holding Co. Ltd., was punished by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the 
CSRC in 2005 for failing to disclose aggregate stock market investment losses of 69.46 
million RMB, amounting to 0.7% and 125% of 2000 and 2002 audited annual net profits, 
respectively. They also failed to disclose controlling by the company Hongyi. 
 
S*ST Jiazhi: Type 3 (Postponements/delays in disclosure) 
Jiamusijindi Paper Co. Ltd., was punished by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2002 for 
failing to disclose the 2001 annual performance in a timely manner.  
 
ST Meiya: Type4 (False statement) 
Guangdong Meiya Group Co. Ltd.,was punished by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2005 
for a failure to timely, accurately and completely reveal the company‟s risk. Despite 
forecasting a positive profit in the third quarter 2004 report, ST Meiya reported a net loss of 
203.36 million RMB in their 2004 annual report.  
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Table 1 Sample description of fraud 
This table presents the sample collection procedure (Panel A), the distributions across years (Panel B), 
industry (Panel C) and type of violation (Panel D) for the corporate fraud sample.  
 
Panel A: Sample exclusions       
    
Firms Cases 
Number of announcements by the CSRC and two stock exchanges (1994-
2011) 369 734 
Reasons for deletions 
   
 
B-share 
  
1 1 
 
No matching firms 
 
51 66 
 
Finance industry 
 
4 11 
 
Multiple announcement in the same year 0 0 
Fraudulent firms deleted 
 
56 78 
Final sample size 
  
313 656 
Number of matched control firms 313 
 Total number of firms in the study 626   
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of fraud cases and fraud firms by year 
Years Fraud cases Fraud firms  
Listed 
firms 
Fraud firms/Listed 
firms 
 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
1994 2 0.30 2 0.37 291 0.69 
1995 0 0.00 0 0.00 323 0.00 
1996 4 0.61 4 0.74 530 0.75 
1997 10 1.52 10 1.85 745 1.34 
1998 5 0.76 5 0.92 851 0.59 
1999 13 1.98 13 2.40 949 1.37 
2000 14 2.13 14 2.58 1088 1.29 
2001 68 10.37 62 11.44 1160 5.34 
2002 55 8.38 47 8.67 1224 3.84 
2003 55 8.38 44 8.12 1287 3.42 
2004 61 9.30 53 9.78 1377 3.85 
2005 95 14.48 64 11.81 1381 4.63 
2006 92 14.02 66 12.18 1434 4.60 
2007 75 11.43 58 10.70 1550 3.74 
2008 37 5.64 33 6.09 1625 2.03 
2009 36 5.49 33 6.09 1718 1.92 
2010 15 2.29 15 2.77 2063 0.73 
2011 19 2.90 19 3.51 2342 0.81 
total 656 100 542 100 
            Average 2.27 
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Panel C: Distribution of fraud cases and fraud firms by industry 
Industries Fraud cases Fraud firms  
 
Number Percent Number Percent 
Manufacturing 333 50.76 173 55.27 
Real estate 82 12.50 37 11.82 
Information technology 62 9.45 20 6.39 
Wholesale and retail trade 39 5.95 20 6.39 
Conglomerates 35 5.34 22 7.03 
Farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 31 4.73 10 3.19 
Social services 21 3.20 8 2.56 
Utilities 16 2.44 9 2.88 
Construction 13 1.98 5 1.60 
Transportation and warehousing 11 1.68 4 1.28 
Mining 10 1.52 4 1.28 
Communication and cultural industry 3 0.46 1 0.32 
Total 656 100 313 100 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Distribution of fraud cases and fraud firms by violation types 
Types Instances of fraud Percent Type # 
Related party transactions 161 14.09 1 
Concealment of significant contracts or events 145 12.69 2 
Postponement/delay in disclosure 141 12.34 3 
False statement 138 12.07 4 
External loan guarantees 113 9.89 5 
Embezzlement by major shareholder  77 6.74 6 
Fabrication of profits 61 5.34 7 
Fictitious income or assets 38 3.32 8 
Fictitious expenses/liabilities 26 2.27 9 
False disclosure of the actual use of raised capital 38 3.32 10 
Concealing lawsuits 29 2.54 12 
Illegal share buy and sell 21 1.84 13 
Mortgage of assets or/and equities 6 0.52 14 
Fictitious supporting documents 5 0.44 15 
Bribe 1 0.09 16 
Illegal purchase of foreign exchange 1 0.09 17 
Misstatement for IPO purposes 1 0.09 18 
Others 141 12.34 11 
Total 1143 100   
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and mean comparison between fraud and matching firms (scaled by total assets) 
Significances at the 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
  Panel A. Full Sample Panel B. Non-consecutive event Panel C. Consecutive event 
Accounting Variables Fraud Matching Diff Fraud Matching Diff Fraud Matching Diff 
Cash and cash equivalents 0.123 0.156 -0.033*** 0.129 0.155 -0.026*** 0.100 0.161 -0.061*** 
Receivable 0.056 0.102 -0.047*** 0.058 0.104 -0.046*** 0.047 0.096 -0.049*** 
Other receivables 0.162 0.059 0.103*** 0.153 0.064 0.089*** 0.194 0.040 0.154*** 
Inventories 0.135 0.182 -0.048*** 0.140 0.180 -0.040*** 0.114 0.191 -0.077*** 
Prepaid expenses  0.038 0.038 0.000 0.040 0.038 0.002 0.033 0.038 -0.005 
Others currents 0.011 0.006 0.005*** 0.011 0.007 0.005*** 0.012 0.004 0.008*** 
Fixed assets 0.274 0.279 -0.005 0.275 0.274 0.001 0.272 0.300 -0.028* 
Intangible assets 0.054 0.042 0.013*** 0.056 0.044 0.012*** 0.047 0.034 0.013*** 
Other non-current 0.137 0.129 0.008 0.128 0.127 0.001 0.171 0.135 0.036*** 
Short-term loans 0.269 0.177 0.092*** 0.253 0.179 0.074*** 0.328 0.168 0.160*** 
Notes payable 0.023 0.027 -0.003* 0.024 0.026 -0.002 0.022 0.030 -0.008** 
Accounts payable 0.086 0.081 0.005* 0.088 0.082 0.006 0.079 0.075 0.004 
Employee benefits payable 0.009 0.008 0.001** 0.009 0.008 0.001* 0.010 0.008 0.002** 
Taxes payable 0.015 0.013 0.002 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.019 0.010 0.008*** 
Other short-term liabilities 0.201 0.135 0.066*** 0.186 0.141 0.046*** 0.252 0.115 0.138*** 
Long-term debt 0.044 0.045 -0.001 0.048 0.046 0.002 0.028 0.040 -0.013** 
Long-term payable 0.006 0.004 0.002** 0.005 0.004 0.002* 0.006 0.004 0.003 
Deferred tax liabilities 0.001 0.001 0.000* 0.001 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 -0.001* 
Other non-current liabilities 0.049 0.018 0.030*** 0.045 0.022 0.023*** 0.061 0.005 0.057*** 
Share capital 0.311 0.251 0.059*** 0.313 0.263 0.049*** 0.303 0.207 0.096*** 
Capital reserves 0.299 0.237 0.062*** 0.292 0.244 0.048*** 0.325 0.211 0.113*** 
Surplus reserves 0.048 0.047 0.002 0.048 0.045 0.003 0.050 0.051 -0.001 
Retained earnings -0.449 -0.097 -0.352*** -0.412 -0.134 -0.278*** -0.585 0.040 -0.624*** 
Other stockholder equity 0.020 0.029 -0.010*** 0.021 0.030 -0.009*** 0.016 0.027 -0.012*** 
25 
 
Table 3 Probit regression results of balance sheet account values (scaled by total assets) on corporate fraud indicator 
e1 and e2 are Fixed assets and Retained earnings residuals to control for multicollinearity. 
a
r1 (Correct 1) prediction is when a fraud firm is predicted as 
“Fraud=1” and r0 (Correct 0) prediction is when a matching firm is correctly predicted as “Fraud=0”. Significances at the 1%, 5%, 10% are denoted by ***, 
**, and * respectively. 
  Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E Panel F 
  In-sample tests Out-of-sample prediction 
  All firms Non-consecutive Consecutive All firms Non-consecutive Consecutive 
Intercept -0.559*** -0.437*** -4.868*** -0.964*** -0.671*** -6.918*** 
Cash and cash equivalents -0.270 -0.135 -0.415 -0.225 -0.161 1.153 
Receivable 0.033 -0.349 1.860 0.469 -0.138 2.873** 
Other receivables 2.746*** 2.273*** 5.247*** 2.985*** 2.322*** 7.337*** 
Inventories -0.997*** -0.939*** -2.143*** -0.934*** -1.172*** -1.666* 
Prepaid expenses  1.548*** 1.756*** 5.313*** 2.126*** 2.244*** 7.887*** 
Others currents 3.029*** 2.192** 6.184* 3.718*** 2.757** 9.723*** 
Fixed assets (e1) -1.097* -0.574 -21.485*** 1.451 1.513* -32.371*** 
Intangible assets 1.537*** 1.435*** 3.598* 1.891*** 1.697*** 3.743 
Other non-current 0.246 -0.068 2.068*** 0.712** 0.260 3.009*** 
Short-term loans 0.742*** 0.682*** 4.878*** 1.412*** 1.337*** 5.074*** 
Notes payable -0.041 -0.386 5.345*** -0.059 -0.404 7.544** 
Accounts payable 0.351 0.794* 3.894** 1.481*** 1.843*** 3.771* 
Employee benefits payable 11.004*** 9.019*** 35.559*** 8.947** 7.130 27.691** 
Taxes payable -2.266** -3.796*** 14.460*** 0.087 -2.688 11.825* 
Other short-term liabilities 0.151 -0.033 3.479*** -0.354 -0.530* 7.238*** 
Long-term debt 0.561 0.843* 2.359 0.929* 1.246** 3.529 
Long-term payable 4.651*** 4.037** 19.963*** 3.603** 2.908 23.923*** 
Deferred tax liabilities 17.369** 29.442*** -47.850* -21.900 -10.782 -173.830 
Other non-current liabilities -0.865*** -0.857** 10.686*** -0.247 -0.564 5.865 
Share capital -0.184 -0.086 0.433 -0.686*** -0.506** 0.356 
Capital reserves 0.170 0.024 3.814*** 0.616*** 0.398* 6.294*** 
Surplus reserves 0.345 1.059 1.523 0.307 1.093 2.557 
Retained earnings (e2) 0.206** 0.173* 2.097** 0.648*** 0.406** -2.978 
Other stockholder equity -1.410** -1.870*** 9.164*** -1.488* -2.516*** 9.274*** 
No. of Observations 2468.00 1938.00 530.00 1816.00 1422.00 394.00 
Log Likelihood -1501.00 -1211.00 -181.26 -1062.00 -860.11 -129.22 
Correct prediction 1 (r1)
a
 0.57 0.57 0.81 0.43 0.37 0.72 
Correct prediction 0 (r0)
a
 0.77 0.74 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.94 
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Table 4 Probit regression results of balance sheet account values (scaled by sales) on 
corporate fraud indicator  
a
r1 (Correct 1) and r0 (Correct 0) prediction are defined in Table 3. Significances at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
 
   Scaled by sales 
  All firms Non-consecutive consecutive 
Intercept -0.160*** -0.111** -0.676*** 
Cash and cash equivalents -0.044 -0.028 -0.679*** 
Receivable -0.067 -0.119 0.545 
Other receivables 0.050** 0.035 0.910*** 
Inventories -0.174*** -0.195*** -0.944*** 
Prepaid expenses  0.417*** 0.387** 1.587** 
Others currents 0.789*** 0.625** 0.002 
Fixed assets  -0.026 -0.004 -0.765*** 
Intangible assets 0.376*** 0.381*** 0.247 
Other non-current -0.013 -0.066* 0.315** 
Short-term loans 0.011 0.029 0.071 
Notes payable 0.18 -0.052 1.292 
Accounts payable 0.411*** 0.306** 1.566** 
Employee benefits payable 2.610*** 1.905* 17.954*** 
Taxes payable -0.28 -0.438* -0.636 
Other short-term liabilities -0.012 -0.033 -0.111 
Long-term debt 0.06 0.236** -1.093*** 
Long-term payable 1.260*** 0.956* 10.319*** 
Deferred tax liabilities 8.401** 17.351*** -41.858*** 
Other non-current liabilities 0.255** 0.181* 2.942*** 
Share capital -0.135*** -0.107*** -0.182 
Capital reserves 0.058** 0.048 0.605*** 
Surplus reserves 0.014 0.152 -1.514* 
Retained earnings  -0.033** -0.026 -0.732*** 
Other stockholder equity -0.146 -0.360* 2.579*** 
No. of Observations 2416 1914 502 
Log Likelihood -1562 -1244 -203.47  
Correct prediction 1 (r1)
a
 0.45 0.45 0.73 
Correct prediction 0 (r0)
a
 0.82 0.80 0.89 
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Table 5 Probit regression results of different types of fraud violations and balance sheet accounts 
Separate regressions are run for seven violation type subsamples. Descriptions of the types are in Table 1. Residuals (e1 and e2),
 a
r1 (Correct 1) and r0 
(Correct 0) prediction are defined in Table 3. Significances at the 1%, 5%, 10% are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
  type1 type2 type3 type4 type5 type6 type789 
Intercept -1.121*** 0.394 0.117 -0.235 -3.089*** -3.199*** -1.075** 
Cash and cash equivalents -0.114 -0.567 -2.201*** -1.405** 0.997 2.300** 0.214 
Receivable -1.361 -1.854** -1.158 -0.629 -0.719 1.2 -1.504 
Other receivables 6.559*** 1.819*** 4.245*** 1.479** 5.175*** 6.627*** 3.237*** 
Inventories -2.173*** -4.037*** -2.448*** -0.667 -0.922 -3.718*** 0.192 
Prepaid expenses  3.879*** 2.520* 1.207 0.138 3.430** 3.059 3.794* 
Others currents 7.884** -2.571 3.113 1.566 12.536** 2.003 2.786 
Fixed assets (e1) -4.502** -4.448** -0.902 -2.401 -2.661 3.341 -0.22 
Intangible assets 1.048 -0.061 -2.329 1.880* 1.078 3.620** 1.445 
Other non-current -0.799 0.551 0.625 -0.549 0.126 -3.511*** -0.129 
Short-term loans 1.815*** 1.436*** 0.606 0.766** 4.385*** 4.678*** 1.010** 
Notes payable 1.438 -1.338 -0.929 1.34 2.45 3.236 -0.997 
Accounts payable 1.795 0.669 4.343*** -0.401 2.723* 1.959 1.421 
Employee benefits payable 37.981*** 6.695 -11.389 19.903*** 11.629 -23.391 16.261 
Taxes payable -14.365*** -10.592*** -8.277* -6.351** 0.372 -9.040* -7.319** 
Other short-term liabilities -0.138 0.131 -0.836 0.291 1.158 4.136*** -0.505 
Long-term debt 2.179** 0.456 -0.969 1.309 3.607** 3.445** 1.939 
Long-term payable 8.427* -0.488 2.102 1.021 16.718* 18.438* 9.098 
Deferred tax liabilities 47.149*** 7.361 -8.787 -0.086 60.919*** 43.569* -13.984 
Other non-current liabilities -1.373 -1.862** -3.265*** -0.613 5.758** 3.288 -1.589 
Share capital 0.438 0.44 0.867 -0.126 0.49 2.117** 1.547*** 
Capital reserves -0.199 0.086 0.031 0.31 1.544* 1.782** 0.474 
Surplus reserves -0.009 -3.343 -1.373 1.457 -3.698 6.930* -8.341*** 
Retained earnings (e2) 0.542** 0.199 2.106*** 0.133 1.792 -0.965 -0.129 
Other stockholder equity -0.866 -4.568*** 2.367 -6.780*** 0.137 -1.882 3.188 
No. of Observations 564 510 354 498 342 306 276 
Log Likelihood -247.63 -272.53 -191.49 -292.2 -132.43 -110.08 -157.93 
Correct prediction 1 (r1)
a
 0.74 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.70 
Correct prediction 0 (r0)
a
 0.85 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.83 0.88 0.76 
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Table 6 Balance sheet accounts associated with each type of fraud violation 
The tendencies for balance sheet accounts to be significantly high or low for each violation type are 
shown below. Descriptions of the types are in Table 1. Residuals (e1 and e2), ar1 (Correct 1) and r0 
(Correct 0) prediction are defined in Table 3. 
 
  Type1  Type2  Type3  Type4  Type5  Type 6 Type 789 
Cash and cash equivalents 
  
Low Low 
 
High 
 Receivable 
 
Low 
     Other receivable High High High High High High High 
Inventories Low Low Low 
  
Low 
 Prepaid expenses  High High 
  
High 
 
High 
Others currents High 
   
High 
  Fixed assets (e1) Low Low 
     Intangible assets 
   
High 
 
High 
 Other non-current           Low   
Short-term loans High High 
 
High High High High 
Notes payable 
       Accounts payable 
  
High 
 
High 
  Employee benefits payable High 
  
High 
   Taxes payable Low Low Low Low 
 
Low Low 
Other short-term liabilities 
     
High 
 Long-term debt High 
   
High High 
 Long-term payable High 
   
High High 
 Deferred tax liabilities High 
   
High High 
 Other non-current liabilities   Low Low   High     
Share capital 
     
High High 
Capital reserves 
    
High High 
 Surplus reserves 
     
High Low 
Retained earnings (e2) High 
 
High 
    Other stockholder equity   Low   Low       
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Table 7 Probit regression results of balance sheet accounts, corporate ownership, board 
structure, and firm specific information on corporate fraud 
Accounting variables are defined as the account to total assets in Panel B and deflated by sales in 
Panel C. e1 and e2 are Fixed assets and Retained earnings residuals to control for multicollinearity in 
Panel B.   Significances at the 1%, 5%, 10% are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively.  
  Panel A   Panel B Panel C 
      Asset- based Sales- based 
Intercept 0.889 Intercept -0.140 0.429* 
 
  Cash and cash equivalents -0.026 -0.084 
 
  Receivable 1.385*** 0.240* 
 
  Other receivables 3.892*** 0.246*** 
 
  Inventories -0.878** -0.104 
 
  Prepaid expenses  1.287 0.302 
 
  Others currents 5.961*** 2.062*** 
 
  Fixed assets (e1) 0.436 -0.002 
 
  Intangible assets -0.038 -0.039 
 
  Other non-current 0.653* 0.115** 
 
  Short-term loans 0.853*** 0.033 
 
  Notes payable 1.105 0.546 
 
  Accounts payable 1.139* 0.367 
 
  Employee benefits payable 5.468 1.020 
 
  Taxes payable -2.284 -0.842 
 
  Other short-term liabilities -0.453 -0.154*** 
Tradable -0.389 Long-term debt 2.178*** 0.291** 
Herfindahl -2.256 Long-term payable 4.146* 1.261* 
Dual -0.055 Deferred tax liabilities 8.341 11.606** 
Govt -0.088 Other non-current liabilities 0.412 0.278 
SBSIZE 0.011 Share capital -0.969*** -0.309*** 
INDE -0.316 Capital reserves 0.262 0.033 
MEET 0.012 Surplus reserves 0.391 0.488* 
SBMEET 0.017 Retained earnings (e2) 0.007 -0.072* 
CPAs 0.004 Other stockholder equity -1.545 -0.070 
Board -0.041** Board -0.033 -0.037* 
Top -1.402*** Top -1.199*** -1.256*** 
ST 1.095*** ST 1.126*** 1.165*** 
PT 1.767*** PT 2.423*** 2.627*** 
RET -0.084*** RET -0.002 -0.071 
No. of Observations 1204 No. of Observations 1204 1204 
Log Likelihood -742.09 Log Likelihood -644.58 -687.24 
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Table 8 Probit regression results of balance sheet account values on corporate fraud 
indicator – Robustness check 
This table presents annual regressions with three subsamples in a one-year cross-section, with Year 0 
representing the fraud announcement year.  
Residuals (e1 and e2),
 a
r1 (Correct 1) and r0 (Correct 0) prediction are defined in Table 3. 
Significances at the 1%, 5%, 10% are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
 
  Event year 
  Year -1 Year 0 Year +1 
Intercept -0.567* -0.487* -0.650*** 
Cash and cash equivalents -0.083 -0.68 0.096 
Receivable 0.189 -0.455 -0.097 
Other receivables 3.683*** 2.905*** 2.002*** 
Inventories -1.282*** -1.530*** -0.437 
Prepaid expenses  2.442** 1.609 0.468 
Others currents 3.395 3.360** 2.596 
Fixed assets (e1) -1.957 -2.316* -0.059 
Intangible assets 0.125 1.339 2.268*** 
Other non-current -0.095 0.124 0.588 
Short-term loans 1.332*** 1.036*** 0.421 
Notes payable 0.401 -0.026 -0.486 
Accounts payable 0.467 0.083 0.861 
Employee benefits payable 7.854 17.182*** 10.974** 
Taxes payable -0.411 -1.712 -1.716 
Other short-term liabilities -0.242 0.535 0.005 
Long-term debt 0.556 -0.215 0.939 
Long-term payable 1.197 6.375** 5.028* 
Deferred tax liabilities 36.666* 18.124 8.634 
Other non-current liabilities -0.056 -0.981 -1.211** 
Share capital -0.682* -0.42 0.194 
Capital reserves -0.132 0.249 0.215 
Surplus reserves 1.688 0.432 -0.647 
Retained earnings (e2) 1.294*** 0.615** 0.022 
Other stockholder equity -0.118 -1.363 -1.911* 
No. of Observations 770 928 770 
Log Likelihood -458.62 -525.50 -485.30 
Correct prediction 1 (r1)
a
 0.61 0.61 0.56 
Correct prediction 0 (r0)
a
 0.75 0.80 0.77 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 This finding is confirmed in robustness tests that scale the accounts using sales instead of total assets. 
2  The relationship between types of fraud and balance sheet accounting ratios is also examined by 
employing clean data. Clean data means only firms with a single type of fraudulent activity are included. 
Similar results around found as reported previously. 
3 The VIF is computed for each variable; no VIF is greater than 3. 
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